Your office manager gets an email about a shared invoice. The link opens a Microsoft sign-in page that looks exactly right. They type their password, approve the request on their phone, and land on a document. Everything worked, and MFA did its job.
Except the page wasn't Microsoft. It passed everything they typed to the real login page and kept the result: a signed-in session. Within minutes, someone else is reading their mailbox with no password prompt and no MFA request.
This is adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing, and it's the reason "we have MFA" is no longer the end of the conversation. The fix is phishing-resistant sign-in, mainly passkeys, and Microsoft is now pushing every Entra ID tenant in that direction. Here is how it works and what to do first.
How phishing kits get past MFA
In an AiTM attack, the criminal runs a proxy server between the user and the real website. The user signs in for real, MFA included, and the proxy captures the session cookie Microsoft hands back. That cookie proves the person already signed in, so the attacker can reuse it without ever completing MFA themselves.
Microsoft is clear that this is not a vulnerability in MFA: it works whatever sign-in method the user chose, as long as that method can be relayed. A six-digit code can be typed into a fake page. A push notification can be approved for a sign-in the attacker started. In the campaign Microsoft described, attackers began payment fraud as little as five minutes after stealing a session.
The tools are cheap and sold as a service. Tycoon2FA, one of the best-known kits, let even less skilled criminals bypass MFA and sent tens of millions of phishing messages reaching over 500,000 organisations a month. Microsoft and Europol disrupted it in March 2026, and by mid-2026 it had not recovered its previous scale. That's good news, but the technique is public and other kits use it. Our article on invoice fraud shows what usually happens next.
What makes a sign-in phishing-resistant
A phishing-resistant method can't be handed over to a fake site, even by a user who has been fooled.
Passkeys are the main example. With a passkey, the private key stays on the user's device and only works for the site or app it was created for, and the user confirms it with a fingerprint, face or PIN. A lookalike domain simply doesn't match, so there's nothing to type in and nothing to relay. The same idea sits behind FIDO2 security keys and certificate-based authentication, which Microsoft named as the way to make MFA "phish-resistant" after the first large AiTM campaigns. The US cybersecurity agency CISA calls FIDO and WebAuthn the only widely available phishing-resistant forms of MFA.
Compare that with the methods most small businesses use today:
| Method | Can a fake login page relay it? |
|---|---|
| SMS or voice code | Yes |
| Authenticator app code | Yes |
| Push approval, with or without number matching | Yes, the user approves the attacker's sign-in |
| Passkey, FIDO2 security key | No |
| Windows Hello for Business, certificate-based authentication | No |
CISA treats number matching as a useful interim step, not the destination. It stops "MFA fatigue" spam, but not a well-built fake page.
Synced or device-bound passkeys
Microsoft Entra ID supports two kinds of passkey, and the difference matters when you plan a rollout:
- Synced passkeys live in a password manager such as iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager. They follow the user to a new phone, which makes them easy for everyday staff.
- Device-bound passkeys never leave one device: a passkey in Microsoft Authenticator, an Entra passkey on Windows, or a FIDO2 security key. If the device is lost, the passkey is gone with it.
Both are phishing-resistant. The trade-off is control. A synced passkey is only as safe as the personal Apple or Google account it syncs through, and Microsoft's documentation positions synced passkeys as a convenient choice for most users outside highly regulated environments. For administrators and the people who approve payments, device-bound passkeys or security keys are the safer choice.
What to do:
- Use synced passkeys or Microsoft Authenticator passkeys for most staff.
- Give every Global Administrator and finance approver a device-bound passkey or two FIDO2 keys (one as a spare).
- Keep a documented recovery route for someone who loses their phone, so the help desk isn't tempted to bypass it over the phone.
Microsoft is moving your tenant to passkeys
This isn't only a good idea any more. As of October 2026, Microsoft is rolling out passkeys as the default sign-in experience in Entra ID, with these dates in its July 2026 announcement:
- From 1 September 2026, users who are enabled for SMS or voice codes are prompted to register a passkey at their next MFA sign-in.
- From 30 October 2026, admins who still need SMS or voice can choose a supported telecom provider through the Microsoft Security Store, at their own cost.
- On 1 February 2027, Microsoft stops delivering SMS and voice codes itself. After that date, passkey registration prompts are enforced for all users, with no opt-out.
If your staff still sign in with an SMS code, the change is coming whether you plan for it or not. Planning it means you decide who gets which passkey, and the help desk isn't flooded on the first Monday of February.
These dates apply to the public Microsoft cloud. Check the Microsoft 365 message centre in your own tenant for the exact timing.
Enforce it, don't just offer it
Registering a passkey doesn't help if an attacker can still sign in with the old method. The control that closes that gap is a Conditional Access policy with an authentication strength that requires phishing-resistant MFA. Conditional Access needs Entra ID P1, which comes with Microsoft 365 Business Premium. We covered the basics, including emergency access accounts, in five Microsoft 365 settings most small businesses get wrong.
Microsoft's own guidance is to start with administrator roles, make sure those admins have registered a suitable method first, and test the policy in report-only mode before switching it on. Then widen it to finance, management, and finally everyone.
Phishing-resistant sign-in also doesn't cover every risk. Malware on a laptop can still steal a session that's already open, and a user can still be talked into paying a fake invoice. That's why managed security partners watch sign-ins, email and devices together rather than relying on any single control.
Where to start
- List who still uses SMS or voice codes in the Entra admin centre (Authentication methods). They're the first group Microsoft will prompt.
- Protect your admins this month: give each Global Administrator a device-bound passkey or security key and require phishing-resistant MFA for admin roles, starting in report-only mode.
- Add finance and management next. They're the accounts invoice fraud goes after.
- Run a registration campaign for everyone else and tell staff beforehand what the prompt looks like, so they don't think it's phishing.
- Keep reporting suspicious mail: forward it to suspicious@safeonweb.be, which helps the CCB warn others.
The takeaway
MFA still matters, but codes and push approvals can be relayed by a convincing fake page, and passkeys can't. Microsoft is moving every tenant towards passkeys by early 2027, so the question is only whether you lead the change or react to it. Start with your administrators and the people who approve payments: a handful of accounts this month closes most of the risk.